ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
amily firms rely too much on internal funds to meet the business demand before. With the development of the business, external financing channels should be considered (Coleman & Carsky, 1999) . However, due to information asymmetry, small-to-medium enterprises have much difficulty in acquiring bank loans (Berger & Udell, 2002; Chakraborty & Hu, 2006; Uchida et al., 2012) . In 2006, private placement was recognized as one way of refinancing in China for the issue of the Administrative Measures for Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies by the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission). Since then, many Chinese companies, especially family firms, have refinanced through private placement in recent years due to its low requirement. In many cases, managers will evaluate the effect on firm value before making decisions. They will not make announcements until they confirm that these decisions can bring a positive effect to the company. According to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), capital market has a strong ability to process public information, which is superior to any individuals or institutions. If the market considers the company to neglect some important factors when making decisions, it will view the announcement as a negative signal and signal back to the company by trading down the stock price. Actually, in Luo's (2005) framework, managers are viewed to learn from the market if their M&A decisions are affected by market reaction. Namely the market can not only redistribute wealth but also generate information to guide managers' decisions. So under this circumstance, should managers neglect market signal and complete the deal as previously determined, or accept market feedback and make some changes to the previous decision? In other words, is market feedback the main reason why family firms not implement the announced plans?
Family firms are often viewed as bearing exploitation of minority shareholders (Morck & Yeung, 2003) and lacking professional management. However, some evidence shows that family firms outperform non-family firms multidimensionally (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006) , which results from its special ownership structure. Namely family shareholders act as stewards more than agents. The core of the debate between the former and the latter is that, what roles do managers in family firms play in decision-making process. What kind of influence does it bring to managers' behavior during private placement?
Focusing on the effect of market feedback on managers' final decisions, we analyze the private placement announced by Chinese family firms from 2006 to 2012 and examine the influence of firm characteristics. The findings contribute to two areas. First, different from previous studies that examine the role of market feedback in firms' investment decisions, we apply it into firms' financing decisions. Second, from the perspective of two-way information flow, we relate managers' decisions to market feedback and show that the market plays an important role in managers' decision-making.
The remainder is as follows. Section II reviews the literature. Section III develops the hypotheses. Section IV focuses on sample, data, and methodology. Section V presents the results. Section VI offers the results of robustness checks. Section VII concludes. Luo (2005) defines the relationship between managers' decisions and market feedback as managers' learning. Kau et al. (2008) propose a different definition, which goes like: if the market reacts positively to the announcement and the deal is finally completed, or the market reacts negatively to the announcement and the deal is finally canceled, then managers learn from the market. No matter how learning is defined, the market has a significant effect on managers' decisions.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Market Feedback and Managers' Decisions
Studies on market feedback mainly concentrate on managers' investment decisions, especially on M&A (Dye & Sridhar, 2002; Kau et al., 2008; Aktas et al., 2011) . Market has a strong ability in processing public information and can generate much new information after observing the announcement. It will feed the new information back to firms by impounding the information into stock prices. For example, the market will regard it as a bad signal in M&A when acquirer's pricing is higher than target's market value. Acquirer's stock price will consequently fall. Extracting useful information, managers will then accept market feedback by adjusting the previously announced plan (Dye & Sridhar, 2002) . However, Blanchard et al. (1993) posit that market feedback may play a limited role in managers' decision-making due to some factors such as managers' self-interest. Managers may ignore market feedback due to their hubris (Roll, 1986) . Aktas et al. (2009) also hold the same view that although the M&A may bring negative effect to firm value, managers will still complete it as previously announced owing to their overconfidence. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that investors tend to overweight firms' short-term performance at the expense of long-run performance. Thus abnormal returns around announcement day of private placement are very high while post-announcement stock price performance is greatly negative, indicating that the market can make some adjustments to the overestimated stock price and reacts timely to new emerging information (Hertzel et al., 2002; Tan et al., 2002) . However, some scholars hold a different view that the market underreacts to the announcement of private placement (Chen et al., 2002) .
1 Some other studies on private placement conclude that private placement can be used by large shareholders to realize their self-interest. When they participate in purchasing shares, the discounts of the placement increase with the amount they purchase. It is consistent with the fact that large shareholders realize their control gains through private placement. Managers tend to sell stocks to passive investors to get loose supervision and achieve their aims to better control the firms by giving passive investors large discounts as compensation (Barclay et al., 2007) .
Above all, we can see that the literature on private placement mainly focuses on its announcement effect, its longand short-term wealth effect, the stock price movement henceforth, and the discounts. Very few consider the effect of market feedback. As main decision-makers, managers can be affected by many external factors such as the supervision from boards and shareholders, the punishment when making wrong decisions, and the macro economic conditions. Therefore, the study on the relationship between managers' decisions and market feedback is very necessary.
Managers in Family Firms: Agents or Stewards?
The main conflict of early work on family business is whether managers in family firms act as agents or stewards. Agency problems arise when managers with superior private information exploit firm resources to maximize their personal gains, which stems from information asymmetry between the principle and the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . The conflict between owners and managers is substantially reduced with family involvement in both ownership and management (Fama & Jensen, 1983) . Due to significant shareholdings, family shareholders have incentive to supervise managers, thus reducing monitoring costs (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) and improving the performance. However, agency problems may be more severe when there is little alignment between managers and the family or when managers can control the business with little ownership.
Actually, agency costs in family firms are mainly between the family and the minority shareholders (Morck & Yeung, 2003) . Generally speaking, the family has strong preference of control rights, which will probably make private placement a tool for them to entrench other minority shareholders (Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2005) . They may destroy firm value by separating control rights from cash-flow rights using control-enhancing mechanisms (Villalonga & Amit, 2006) . On one hand, too much ownership with unchallenged control rights can induce owners' power abusing to exploit the business such as the extraordinary dividend payouts (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2000) . On the other hand, if the family aims to control the business with little ownership (also called pyramiding structure), other ways to exploit minority shareholders and gain control rights will emerge (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006) . Both of them go against the maximization of firm value.
While the agency theory posits managers' self-interesting behavior, the stewardship theory indicates that regardless of ownership, managers in family firms will subordinate personal goals to business goals and tend to pursue nonfinancial goals (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004) . Actually, family owners often engage in emotional investment in the business (Bubolz, 2001) . Consequently, managers in family firms often hold superior attitudes of stewardship (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006) , which can improve the performance. However, the emotional ties don't blind the owners to impose agency cost control mechanisms on managers , suggesting that managers in family firms act as some kind of combination of agents and stewards.
Literature Summary
Studies on market feedback effect mainly focus on managers' investment decisions, with very few concerning the potential relationship between market feedback and financing decisions. Just as what we have mentioned above, managers also tend to utilize market feedback to improve financing decisions.
In the past, very limited attention was paid to small-to-median enterprises, especially family firms, in the studies on both market feedback and private placement. Actually, more and more Chinese family firms start to use private placement as a main channel to refinance in recent years. What's more, whether managers in family firms act as agents or stewards has been debated for years. It is valuable to investigate managers' behavior in Chinese family firms during private placement. In family firms' private placement, managers' attitude towards market feedback should be taken into account. Therefore, we discuss the relationship between market feedback and managers' final decisions in Chinese family firms' private placement and examine the factors of this relationship.
HYPOTHESE DEVELOPMENT
Previous studies argue that capital market can generate new information, which is not known to managers, and impound it into stock prices (Dye & Sridhar, 2002) . Some researchers examine that managers' final decisions can be affected by market reaction to the announcement in investment decision-making (Blanchard et al., 1993; Luo, 2005; Kau et al., 2008) . Firms will adjust the announced repurchased amounts of shares based on the stock returns following the announcement (Stephens & Weisbach, 1998) . Managers' final decisions are influenced by market reaction to the registration of seasoned equity offering (Giammarino et al., 2004) . Actually, not just the investment decisions, other corporate actions such as refinancing, can also be influenced by market feedback. Managers' behavior is reflected in their every decision (Luo, 2005) .
Due to the highly concentrated ownership, family firms prefer private placement to public equity financing to maintain family control (Wu et al., 2007) . Family involvement in management makes managers more prudent in making decisions. Compared with non-family firms, they may pay more attention to market feedback. What's more, their behavior can be affected by many external factors such as firms' industry, the supervision imposed on them, and the corporate governance mechanism. How do these factors work in managers' attitude towards market feedback in family firms?
First, market feedback to the announcement is less informative for high-tech firms than others. Compared with private placement, public offering requires firms to disclose more information, which can induce larger conveying costs. Furthermore, the disclosed information is easy to be used by competitors, which thus may be conducive to firms' development. Hence, high-tech family firms have the incentive not to disclose such information when it is disadvantageous to their competitiveness (Verrecchia, 1983; Wagenhofer, 1990) . Therefore, family firms with abundant sensitive information prefer private placement (Hertzel & Smith, 1993; Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1999) .
Consequently, the information asymmetry of private placement is higher for high-tech firms than others (Wu, 2004) , although the disclosure of proprietary technology information is important for market to evaluate the project covered by the placement. Thus, family firms tend to reduce the disclosure of such critical information, resulting in the difficulty for outsiders to evaluate firm value. So high-tech firms have severe information opacity. Namely, family firms' industry can influence the information disclosure. Holding plenty of private information, managers in hightech family firms may regard market feedback less informative and tend to ignore it.
Second, according to the monitoring hypothesis, private placement can strengthen the supervision on managers. By introducing active large shareholders, private placement can increase ownership concentration, which can reduce agency problems and increase firm value (Wruck, 1989) . Wu (2004) conducts a study on purchasers' properties and conclude that the placements with managers participating in purchasing have more discounts than those without managers, and the discounts increase with the decrease of managers' shareholding proportion. This evidence indicates that managers are self-interested. Hence, absence from monitoring managers can bring family firms much loss. Many studies show that the blockholders have greater incentive to oversight management. Therefore, family members participating in purchasing placed shares can restrain managers' self-interested behavior. Due to the supervision from family members, managers tend to adjust the previously announced plan according to market feedback in shareholders' best interests.
Third, managers' behavior can be affected not only by their nature but also by the kinship with leaders and the corporate governance mechanism . Whether managers in family firms act as stewards or agents has been debated for years. More closely aligned with firms, managers have more propensities to listen to the market (Kau et al., 2008) , thus they act more as stewards. In China, most family firms are yet in their early stage. Many family members participate in both firms' daily management and the allocation of residual claims. That is, control rights are little separated from ownership. This mechanism narrows the information gap between controllers and managers. Under this circumstance, family managers act as stewards more than agents. Therefore, they have much motivation to run the business well. So they will notice market feedback and make proper decisions to improve firm value. To summarize:
H1: Managers in family firms are more likely to accept market feedback than those in non-family firms in private placement.
H2:
Managers in family firms are less likely to accept market feedback in private placement when the firm is hightech.
H3:
Managers in family firms are more likely to accept market feedback in private placement when family members participate in purchasing the placed shares.
H4:
Managers in family firms are more likely to accept market feedback in private placement when family members serve as managers or when the separation of control rights from ownership is small.
METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data
We select announcement day of board resolution as pricing benchmark day. 
Method
Market feedback is measured with market reaction to the announcement. We use event study to examine market reaction and obtain CAR (cumulative abnormal return) using market model:
Rit=αi+βi RMt+εit
where Rit is firms' daily stock returns. RMt is the daily returns of market portfolio. εit is the daily abnormal returns. We select [-180,-30 ] days before announcement day as the estimation period. If stocks are suspended that day, the first trading day after the announcement is the benchmark day. [-5,5 ] days around announcement day are selected as the event window. We use the following Logit models to test the hypotheses:
Models and Variables
Model 1 is to test the effect of family involvement on managers' attitude towards market feedback. Model 2 is the key model. Model 3 is for robustness checks. Definition of variables is in Table 2 .
3 Cases that the firm doesn't complete the announced plan include: it isn't implemented within one valid year such as prolonging validity period and issuing trans-right shares, the firms announce the failure or giving up implementing, and the firms announce the adjustment. 4 Market is divided into "bull" and "bear" according to the trend of overall market direction during sustained period. For example, overall market direction kept increasing during June in 2005 and October in 2007, so it belongs to "bull" and overall market direction kept falling during November in 2007 and October in 2008, so it belongs to "bear".
RESULTS
We investigate: (1) the relationship between market feedback and managers' final decisions on whether the previously announced plan is implemented. (2) The effect of family involvement on this relationship. (3) Whether the relationship varies with some factors. We winsorize the variables at 1% level. Table 4 lists market reaction to the announcement. To eliminate the effect of measures, we measure market reaction with different event windows: [-10, 10] , [-5, 5] , and [-3, 3] . The difference in Table 4 is between CARs of the firms that complete the previously announced plan and those that finally cancel the announced plan. Table 4 -1 is the result of full sample. CARs are all bigger than zero, indicating that market reacts positively to the announcement, consistent with most of the studies on the announcement effect of private placement (Tan, 2002; Hertzel et al., 2002) . Firms finally completing the placement have higher CARs than those that finally cancel the plan. Differences between them are all significant, showing that managers listen to the market during private placement: managers tend to complete the announced plan when market views them positively and cancel the plan when they are not admitted by market.
Relationship Between Market Feedback and Managers' Decisions
The results from Tables 4-2 to 4-5 show that, family firms that are non-high-tech, that with family members participating in purchasing, that with family members serving as managers, and that with small separation of two rights tend to accept market feedback. The Clute Institute Macro environment and information on shareholdings are both the information which can be directly acquired by the market. We thus control them in our models. However, Table 5 shows that ROA, Level, Famown, and Market all have no significant differences between firms completing the placements and those finally not. We also control the effect of firm size and the difference is significant, from which we draw the same conclusion to Luo's (2005) . All the other variables have the expected results.
Multivariate Analysis
Descriptive Analysis and Univariate Comparisons
Effect of Market Feedback On Managers' Decisions
We apply model 2 into this analysis and Table 6 displays the results. In test 1, CAR is the key variable while in tests 2-6, CAR and the interactions are the key variables. Test 1 in Table 6 is the result of managers' final decisions on market feedback. Coefficient of CAR is significantly positive, indicating that managers' final decisions are indeed affected by market feedback. The probability of completing the announced plans increases with market's favorability. Market plays an important role in managers' final decision-making.
In tests 2-5, we put each interaction into the model and test 6 includes all the interactions. Consistent with H2-H4, coefficients of the interactions CAR×Tech, CAR×Part, CAR×Serve, and CAR×Wedge are respectively significantly negative at 1% level, significantly positive at 5% level, significantly positive at 1% level, and significantly negative at 10% level. The results indicate that in final decision-making, managers tend to be affected by market feedback when family firm is non-high-tech, when managers are more strongly supervised, when managers are more aligned with firms, and when separation of control rights from ownership is smaller.
Family firms in high-tech industry have more inside information, which makes market less informative. Thus information asymmetry leads managers to tend to ignore the signal from market. Due to absence from daily management, the family may be blinded by managers. Participating in purchasing can offer them more occasions to observe managers' behavior. Namely, family involvement in private placement can make managers place firms' interest in the first, resulting in their tendency to accept market feedback. According to the stewardship theory, regardless of ownership, family managers (family members serve as managers) generally behave in firms' value maximization. That is, family managers will regard market feedback as guidance for their decisions in private placement. Furthermore, small separation of control rights from ownership can keep firms belonging to the family. Thus, the family possesses the incentive to monitor managers (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) , thereby increasing the probability that managers listen to the market.
In tests 1-6, coefficients of Serve and Wedge are both significantly positive. It may be related to the agency problems in Chinese family firms. In China, most of family firms are yet under control of founders. The imperfect corporate governance mechanism may lead the family to utilize their information superiority to exploit outsiders.
(1) When family members sever as managers, as insiders, they have more private information. Under this condition, out of the intention to either meet fund demand or expropriate minority shareholders, managers may choose to complete the announced plan without considering other factors. (2) Large separation of control rights from ownership can induce severe agency problems. On one hand, pyramiding structure can amplify the financial and psychological gap between the firm and the family. In this case, private placement may be used by the family to expropriate minority shareholders. On the other hand, managers may use private placement to realize personal gains. Hence, when separation of the two rights is large and when family members serve as managers, firms are more likely to complete the previously announced plans.
Early work on family business mainly focuses on whether managers in family firms behave as agents or stewards . Results in Table 6 show that managers in family firms are some extent of combination of both. Table 7 reports the descriptive results. Table 7 -1 show that there are 258 (56.21%) firms completing the announced plan and 201 (43.79%) firms finally cancel the plan. Table 7 -2 reports the descriptive result of whether managers in family firms listen to the market. Result shows that most of managers in family firms accept market feedback. Table  7 -3 is the joint result of Tables 7-1 and 7-2. No matter whether the announced plan is completed, most of managers in family firms make final decisions according to market reaction. It indicates that after the announcement, the market generates some new information not known to managers and guides them in decision-making. (-5,5 ) to judge whether managers accept market feedback.
Factors Affecting Managers' Attitude Towards Market Feedback
Results of model 3 are presented in Table 8 . Test 1 is the full sample result. In test 2, inspired by Kau et al. (2008) , we use the subsample with CAR<0 only, for if market reaction to the announcement is highly positive (CAR>>0), managers are not likely to cancel the decision, only if there are other key factors affecting them. Therefore, the subsample with CAR<0 is less noisy. In Table 8 , all the key variables have the excepted sign, which support H2-H4. In test 1, all of the coefficients of Tech, Part, Serve, and Wedge have expected signs, indicating that family firms' industry can affect the information disclosure. Insiders of high-tech family firms hold far more information than the market, leading to the market less informative.
Family members' participation in purchasing strengthens the supervision imposed on managers. Managers under weak supervision may ignore long-term benefit in order to realize personal gains. Namely, managers are not likely to ignore market feedback when they are strongly monitored.
When family members serve as managers, they know more about the decision. The information asymmetry is less severe between controllers and managers while more severe between controllers and outsiders. For example, family firms may need much fund to finance a project which may take a very long time to make profits. As Kahneman and Tversky (1979) posit, outsiders tend to overweight firms' recent performance at the expense of long-term performance. As insiders, managers know more about the projects than the market, resulting in that managers tend to ignore market feedback and choose to complete the previously announced plan.
Large separation of control rights from ownership can induce serious agency problems. Managers may abuse their power to pursue personal gains, such as more spare time (adjusting the plan may take a long time) and steep discounts for passive investors to acquire lax supervision. Wholly speaking, the results are consistent with our empirical conclusions.
CONCLUSIONS
Apart from redistributing resources among traders in the secondary market, capital market can also generate information that guides managers' decisions. Market feedback to announcements of the relevant decisions is one of the valuable sources of information to managers. They can observe market feedback to get a better understanding of whether their decisions are value-increasing or value-reducing. Consequently, many studies focus on how managers use market feedback to guide their investment decisions, with very few concerning the relation between market feedback and financing decisions. However, agency problems between shareholders and managers may blind controllers to trust managers, leaving high possibility for managers to pursue personal gains. Thus they may ignore market feedback. Furthermore, whether managers in family firms act as agents or stewards have received perennial concern. Therefore, this study adds to the literature by examining whether managers in family firms accept market feedback in private placement and further explores whether agency problems affect managers' attitude towards market feedback.
We find that managers in family firms generally use market feedback as an input in final decision-making. It is affected by three factors: managers' private information, the supervision imposed on managers, and the corporate governance structure. When managers' information is less than that of the market, when managers are strongly monitored, and when managers are more closely aligned with firms, they tend to listen to the market.
Our work has several implications for future research and managerial practice. As for future research, scholars have found that information leakage exists in private placement. Thus, future studies may take it into consideration. As for managerial practice, first, information asymmetry can influence managers' attitude towards market feedback. Insufficient information disclosure brings difficulty to market to evaluate firm value, causing stock prices to fall. Hence, information transparency of private placement should be improved, especially for high-tech firms. Second, family should enhance the supervision on managers and improve managers' alignment with firms to prevent them from pursuing personal gains through private placement or other ways. Third, mechanism of rewards and punishments should be established in family firms. Under this mechanism, in the long run, competent managers should benefit from good decisions and can quantify the benefits. Conversely, managers who fail to listen to the market will bear the costs at their own peril.
